A new methodology to model interdependency of Critical Infrastructure Systems during Hurricane Sandy’s event by Crupi, P. et al.
04 August 2020
POLITECNICO DI TORINO
Repository ISTITUZIONALE
A new methodology to model interdependency of Critical Infrastructure Systems during Hurricane Sandy’s event / Crupi,
P.; Agrawal, A.; Cimellaro, GIAN PAOLO. - ELETTRONICO. - (2016). ((Intervento presentato al convegno Engineering
mechanics Institute Conference 2016 and Probabilistic Mechanics & Reliability Conference 2016 (EMI 2016 & PMC
2016) tenutosi a Nashville, nel May 22-25, 2016.
Original
A new methodology to model interdependency of Critical Infrastructure Systems during Hurricane
Sandy’s event
Publisher:
Published
DOI:
Terms of use:
openAccess
Publisher copyright
(Article begins on next page)
This article is made available under terms and conditions as specified in the  corresponding bibliographic description in
the repository
Availability:
This version is available at: 11583/2656563 since: 2019-10-18T18:19:44Z
ASME
A new Methodology to Model Interdependency of Critical Infrastructure Systems 
During Hurricane Sandy’s Event 
 
Introduction 
The beginning of the new century has been characterized by an increased number of 
catastrophic events taking place around the world. These events refers to multiple man-made 
and natural events that hit communities with different social, economic, and political 
characteristics while always causing human casualties and damage to private and public 
possessions that are often uncountable. Lately, attention has been focused on reducing the 
effects and protecting people and businesses against these extreme events by improving their 
resilience at the community level. This is described as an increase in their ability to withstand 
the impact and the consequences of similar, as well as more powerful, extreme and disruptive 
events and to recover from them in the shortest amount of time possible. In particular, this 
goal can be achieved by limiting the damage that during these events are reported by the so 
called “critical infrastructure sectors,” which represent the “backbone” for the functioning of 
the United States. The networking among these sectors represents their strong points, which 
allows for their proper functioning in normal condition, as well as one of their weakest points, 
since it allows a perturbation to a sector to easily propagate to other interconnected sectors. 
These interconnections among the critical infrastructure sectors can be analyzed with a 
mathematic model that, based on economic data, can be applied to give numerical values to 
these interdependencies and to model the interaction between this network and the disruptive 
event. Among the several models applicable, this analysis adopts the Inoperability Input-
Output Model developed by Haimes and Jang (2001) to model the network interconnectivity, 
understand the propagation of cascading effects, and help policy-makers to identify the best 
intervention strategy to implement in response to the event.  
 
Hurricane Sandy and The Impact on The Critical Infrastructure Systems of The 
Metropolitan Area of New York 
Hurricane Sandy was one of the most remarkable natural catastrophic events that took place 
in over the past few years. It was the last hurricane of the 2012 Atlantic season impacting the 
Atlantic coast of North America, causing human casualties and billion dollars in damage to 
houses, businesses, infrastructures, and other facilities located in countries such as Cuba, the 
Bahamas, and the United States. People, mass media, and government organizations used to 
refer to it as a “Superstorm” due to its unique features and strength. One of its most distinctive 
characteristics was its unusual westbound track caused by its interaction with two other 
weather systems that were taking place in the Atlantic Ocean around that time. This 
occurrence not only blocked the common eastern turn, that characterizes the area’s hurricanes, 
but also intensified the storm winds and increased its extent up to 1800 km in diameter. Fig. 1 
gives an idea of the size and the speed of Sandy’s winds while it was moving along the U.S. 
Atlantic coast. Its impact was also amplified by the superposition of multiple events that took 
place simultaneously when the storm hit the U.S. mainland in New Jersey. In fact, it made 
landfall exactly at high astronomical tide during full moon, enhancing the effect of storm 
surge waters that the high-speed winds were pushing towards the coast. As a consequence, the 
storm surge that characterized its impact set record-breaking levels of surge waters and wave 
heights in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, for example at Battery Park on the 
southern tip of Manhattan were a storm surge of 9.56 ft above normal tide levels was reported 
(Blake et al., 2013). Overall, more than 1000 kilometers of U. S. coastline were impacted 
mostly by the storm surge generated by Hurricane Sandy. Fig. 2 evidences the unusual track 
of the storm, as well as some of its features, such as storm category, wind speed, and 
minimum sea level pressure. 
[Fig. 1-2 near here] 
 
One of the most affected regions along Sandy’s path was the metropolitan area of New York. 
Several reasons brought this analysis to focus on the events occurred in New York City and 
New Jersey counties falling into the metropolitan area. On one hand, this area is not 
commonly associated with hurricane activity, due to their tendency of moving away from the 
U.S. mainland after impacting the southern states. Hurricane Sandy was only the third 
hurricane that hit New Jersey in its history (Kunz et al., 2013), corresponding to a 1% 
probability of being hit by similar catastrophic events during the season, as assessed by the 
Colorado State University (http://typhoon.atmos.colostate.edu). On the other hand, 
communities are unprepared and vulnerable against such kinds of extreme events, causing this 
area to suffer the most damage and economic losses because of the hurricane itself and its 
effects, such as flooding, the storm surge, and high-speed winds. One more reason is that the 
hurricane impacted an area that is characterized by a very developed network of critical 
infrastructure sectors, whose complexity and extent represent its most distinctive feature, as 
well as the cause of its vulnerability to a broad range of disruptive events. In particular, Fig. 3 
gives a better idea of the intricacy of the solely transportation system in New York City and 
its surrounding area.  
[Fig. 3 near here] 
 A detailed analysis of the damage occurred to the infrastructures of this selected area has been 
outlined by the New York City Government (2013) report “PlaNYC: A Stronger, More 
Resilient New York,” as well as other supporting damage data has been provided by the 
researches published by Kunz et al. (2012), Blake et al. (2013), and Botts et al. (2013), among 
others. Moreover, for the purposes of their research, Haraguchi et al. (2014) summarized the 
detailed damage analysis provided by the New York City Government in Table 1. They 
distinguished the damage occurred to the critical infrastructure sectors between direct and 
indirect damages. Direct damages are defined as the “physical damages caused by Sandy in 
each sector” whereas indirect damages are those “caused by functional problems such as 
power outage, overload, and impacts of failures in other sectors.” As showed by Table 1, 
direct damages are mostly physical damages to sector facilities while the indirect damages can 
be attributed to the effects that these physical damages induce on the other sectors. 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
Moreover, the damage analysis confirms the high degree of interdependency existing among 
the critical infrastructure sectors, meaning that each one of them strongly rely on the services 
and the outputs provided by other connected systems. As highlighted by Haraguchi et al. 
(2014), this interconnectedness determines the several indirect damages triggered by a sector 
that falls onto the others. In fact, as these systems are highly interconnected, the consequences 
of disruptions may propagate widely (Rose et al., 1997).  
As a consequence of this interconnectedness, several cascading effects on the networked 
sectors of the area have been reported. For example, as reported by Flegenheimer (2012), 
power outages limited efforts for the restoration of subway service, since the running of a test 
train in the subway system could not start until power had been restored to the path of the test 
train. As also confirmed by the New York City Government (2013), power outages 
contributed to the global transportation network shutdown, as well as to the inoperability of 
liquid fuel facilities. Moreover, the deployment of utility restoration crews and emergencies 
vehicles to areas in need was delayed by damage that occurred to the transportation 
infrastructures and by the fuel disruption. In addition, buildings, hospitals and other 
healthcare centers had to be evacuated due to the power outages and the lack of fuel and 
failure of emergency backup generators. These cascading effects led to further indirect 
damages and problems to the entire network. For example, long lines and consequent traffic 
congestions were reported in the proximity of gas stations that still had power to pump fuel, 
therefore the disruption of the utilities sector affected both the liquid fuel and the 
transportation sectors at the same time. Moreover, damaged streets hampered utility efforts to 
reach and repair the damage to impacted facilities that provide power to streets as well as 
buildings, thus the damage to transportation infrastructures affected both the utilities and 
buildings sectors. Overall, as also confirmed by Haraguchi et al. (2014) in Table 1, we can 
affirm that the power sector indirectly affected practically all of the other sectors in the 
network, especially the transportation, liquid fuel, telecommunication, and healthcare sectors, 
and therefore it can be considered as the most critical infrastructure among the others. Fig. 4 
gives a better idea of the cascading effects generated only by power outages during Hurricane 
Sandy. 
[Fig. 4 near here] 
 
Several initiatives can be implemented to increase the community resilience of a region 
affected by an extremely disruptive event so as to increase its ability to withstand and recover 
from similar future events. In December 2012, immediately after Hurricane Sandy, the New 
York City Government understood the need for a long-term plan to increase resiliency in the 
city’s several infrastructures. It launched the so called Special Initiative for Rebuilding and 
Resiliency (SIRR) that produced a plan of strategies to adopt in order to strengthen the 
protection of New York’s infrastructures, buildings, and communities from the impacts of 
future climate risks, published in the New York City Government (2013) report PlaNYC: A 
Stronger, More Resilient New York. Among the more of 200 initiatives outlined, our attention 
was focused on analyzing those concerning utilities, liquid fuel, and transportation sectors. 
Basing on the damage analysis, these were the most directly damaged sectors by the storm 
and, as confirmed by Table 1, those that caused the majority of indirect damages. They can 
also be considered as the key sectors in the overall infrastructure network, because of the 
strong dependency of the others sectors on them and also the high concentration of their 
facilities in the area under analysis, from refineries to power plants and a dense transportation 
system.  
 
Inoperability Input-Output Model (IIM) 
The Inoperability Input-Output Model (IIM) was proposed by Haimes and Jiang (2001) as an 
adaptation of the original input-output model, developed by Leontief (1951, 1986) to define 
the degree of interdependency among industry sectors of a national or regional economy. 
Basing on the same economic data of the Leontief’s model, the IIM assesses the impact of 
disruptive events on the network of interconnected economic systems in terms of 
inoperability. The authors define inoperability as the “inability of a system to perform its 
intended function,” which is a function of the impact of the external perturbation event as well 
as the network interconnectedness. 
The model quantify these interactions among the interdependent systems basing on the 
economic data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). This supporting 
database defines the national input-output accounts among industries in terms of their 
production and consumption of goods through the so-called make and use matrices. The make 
matrix represents the interaction between industries and commodities in terms of production 
of commodities. It is an “industry-by-commodity” matrix in which each element represents 
the monetary value of each commodity along the columns produced by each industry along 
the rows expressed in millions of dollars. On the other hand, the use matrix defines the same 
interaction in terms of consumption of commodities. It is an “commodity-by-industry” matrix 
in which each element represents the monetary value of each commodity along the rows 
consumed by each industry along the columns expressed in millions of dollars. A combination 
of these matrices is used to calculate the so-called Leontief technical coefficient matrix A that 
numerically defines the degree of interdependency among economic industries. Firstly, the 
elements of the “make” and “use” matrices are divided by their respective column 
summations, defining the so-called normalized “make” and “use” matrices. The matrices so 
obtained are then multiplied each other, so as to define the “industry-by-industry” 
interdependency matrix A reported in Eq. 3.  
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This interdependency matrix defines the degree of dependency of the production output of the 
each industry from the production input given by each of the others industries at the national 
U.S. economic level. In order to provide a more accurate analysis of these interdependencies 
for a specific region of interest, this matrix can be specialized through the so-called RIMS II 
accounts. Provided by the BEA’s Regional Economic Analysis Division, they are a database 
of regional multipliers calculated on the basis of regional personal income and wage-and-
salary data. As reported by Haimes (2005), “empirical tests suggest that regional multipliers 
can be used as surrogates for time-consuming and expensive surveys without compromising 
accuracy”. Also, as reported by Miller et al. (1989), the focus of the input-output analysis to 
the network of interconnected sectors of a specific region can give valid results since 
interregional feedbacks are small and do not influence this analysis applied to a closed region. 
These multipliers are obtained from the so-called location quotients for regional 
decomposition calculated as: 
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These location quotients are used to regionalize the national technical coefficient matrix A 
and obtain the regional interdependency matrix AR as in Eq. 5: 
[min( , )] min( ,1)R Rij i ijA diag l A a l a     (5) 
 
Among the several models developed by the authors, the one that can be used to analyze the 
impact of Hurricane Sandy in the area under analysis is the so-called demand-reduction IIM. 
This model is derived from the combination of the original IIM with the data provided by 
BEA regarding the national input-output economic accounts. Inoperability is quantified as a 
reduction of production caused by perturbations to the demand, rather than as the degraded 
capacity to deliver the intended output, as evaluated by the physical one. The model evaluates 
how the inoperability of a perturbed system influences the other interdependent ones with 
various degrees of impact: 
* 1 *( )q I A c          (6) 
The terms of Eq. 6 are derived from the original IIM basing on the following assumptions: 
• q: demand-side inoperability vector, whose elements represent the inoperability of 
single industries defined as the normalization of the reduction of their production with 
respect to the “as-planned” production:  
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• A*: demand-side interdependency matrix, whose elements are defined on the basis of 
the Leontief technical coefficients and the ratio between the “as-planned” productions 
of the interconnected industries: 
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• c*: demand-side perturbation vector in which each element is defined as the ratio 
between the decrease in the final demand and the “as-planned” production: 
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For the purpose of this analysis, the derived equation for the demand-reduction regional IIM 
is the following: 
* 1 *( )R R Rq I A c          (10) 
in which each element assumes the same meaning described before but referred to a regional 
scale and the corresponding regional demand-side matrix A*R can be written as: 
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Overall, this model is defined as the static IIM since it allows the relationships and 
consequent interactions among industries for a specific year and area of interest to be 
described, creating a fixed picture of the situation of a national and regional economy. 
Haimes (2005) and Haimes, Lian (2006) also developed the so-called dynamic IIM, a 
development that “supplements and complements the static IIM.” This dynamic extension of 
the original IIM allows for the better evaluation and comprehension of the way industries 
recover from their inoperability during the following recovery phase, according to their ability 
to “bounce-back” to the condition they had before the event, therefore describing their 
resiliency. The model evaluates an exponential reduction of inoperability during the recovery 
phase with the following equation: 
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qi(0) is the inoperability of i sector at initial perturbation (t=0), qi(t) is the inoperability of i 
sector during the recovery phase (0<t<Ti), and aii* is the diagonal element of the demand-
reduction matrix A* or A*R. 
ki is the so called industry resilience coefficient or interdependency recovery rate calculated 
as: 
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in which λ is the recovery constant, representing the ratio between the sector i inoperability, 
evaluated when initial perturbation occurs and when the recovery time is achieved, τ 
corresponds to the recovery time Ti, and qi(Ti) is the inoperability of i sector at recovery time 
(Ti). The ratio defines how fast/the speed in which the inoperability is recovered. The 
inoperability qi(Ti), as well as Ti, can be supposed based on the application of risk 
management actions or obtained from the analysis of damage data regarding the disruptive 
event and the consequent recovery time estimation. Very small values of a ii
* do not influence 
the recovery rate so much; otherwise they would contribute to reducing the recovery rate. On 
the other hand, greater aii
* defines a greater recovery rate, meaning that the interdependency 
of the disrupted sector on the others reduces recovery time. 
 
APPLICATION OF THE REGIONAL DEMAND-REDUCTION IIM TO (EVALUATE 
INTERDEPENDENCIES AMONG C.I.S. IN) HURRICANE SANDY CASE STUDY 
The regional demand-reduction IIM has been applied for the evaluation of the degree of 
interdependency among economic industries or critical infrastructure sectors in the portion of 
the metropolitan area of New York that has been identified. 
The 2012 make and use matrices needed to run the IIM have been downloaded from the BEA 
website since Hurricane Sandy hit in October 2012. Then, the RIMS II multipliers have been 
purchased for the region of interest, defined as the composition of the counties corresponding 
with the 5 boroughs of the city of New York and the counties of the state of New Jersey that 
fall into its metropolitan area. Despite they refer to 2013 regional data, they can be used for 
the regional decomposition of 2012 national data since they do not vary much between one 
year and the following, thus the relation among infrastructures practically stays the same. 
They are presented as tables in which every column identifies the sector whose demand 
reduction affects the sectors along the rows. For the purpose of this analysis, the multipliers 
referring to the column sectors named “utilities,” “mining,” and “transportation” have been 
chosen. Their level of aggregation does not correspond with the same of the make and use 
matrices, thus, on the basis of some assumptions, the original multipliers have been 
manipulated and the adapted multipliers reported in Table X have been obtained. 
[Table 2 near here] 
  
Three type of interdependency matrices have been calculated for the application of the model. 
The first matrix is the national interdependency matrix A (Table 3), obtained with Eq. 3 from 
the combination of the normalized make and use matrices. Then, the regional interdependency 
matrix AR has been calculated by considering each column of the adapted multipliers in Table 
2 and implementing them in Eq. 5. A matrix AR is calculated for each of the three different 
sectors considered, therefore defining a relationship among the interconnected systems that 
changes and adapts itself according to which sector is subjected to demand reduction. Finally, 
Code Industries liutilities litransp limining
 11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 0 0 0
 21 Mining 0.0006 0.00015 1.002567
 22 Utilities 1.0058 0.007488 0.007567
 23 Construction 0.0135 0.008325 0.010867
 31G Manufacturing 0.0164 0.032513 0.020433
 42 Wholesale trade 0.014 0.031438 0.017433
 44RT Retail trade 0.0034 0.005925 0.001933
 48TW Transportation and warehousing 0.0294 1.0778 0.009467
 51 Information 0.0121 0.0184 0.0102
 FIRE Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 0.0709 0.1215 0.0564
 PROF Professional and business services (includes waste management) 0.0514 0.044425 0.036367
 6 Educational services, health care, and social assistance 0.0009 0.00085 0.0007
 7 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 0.0093 0.006425 0.003967
 81 Other services, except government 0.0102 0.010125 0.002833
 G Government 0.008903 0.020372 0.000262
three regional demand-side interdependency matrices A*R have been calculated according to 
Eq. 11 as a function of the ratio between the total industry regional outputs of two industries. 
The regional production outputs referring to the region of interest are evaluated proportionally 
to the national one by calculating the following ratio between the U.S. GDP and the combined 
GDP relative to New York City and New Jersey: 
 GDP U.S. (2012) = 14,530,716 million dollars 
 GDP N.Y.C.+N.J. (2012) = 1,446,659 million dollars 
 GDP N.Y.C.+N.J. / GDP U.S. ≈ 0.1 (1/10) 
[Table 3 near here] 
  
Interdependency matrix A 
Finally, the model has been applied to evaluate the rankings of the most affected sectors in 
terms of inoperability caused by a functionality reduction to “utilities,” “mining,” and 
“transportation” sectors. Fig. 5, Fig. 6, and Fig. 7 and the corresponding Table 5, Table 6, and 
Table 7 report the results obtained for a 10% trial input of their functionality reduction. In 
fact, the order of the ranking obtained does not change for an increase/decrease of this value, 
since the output values change proportionally to the input, thus a trial value can be considered 
to graphically represent this ranking of inoperability. 
[Fig. 5 and Table 5 near here] 
[Fig. 6 and Table 6 near here] 
[Fig. 7 and Table 7 near here] 
Industries/Industries 11 21 22 23 31G 42 44RT 48TW 51 FIRE PROF 6 7 81 G
IOCode Name Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and huntingMining Utilities Construction ManufacturingWholesale tradeR tail tradeTransportation and warehousingInformation Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasingProf ssional and business servicesEducational services, health care, and social assistanceArts e t rtainment, recreation, accommodation, and food servicesOther services, except governmentGov rnm nt
11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 0.2177 0.0003 0.0000 0.0016 0.0474 0.0000 0.0013 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0003 0.0057 0.0001 0.0011
21 Mining 0.0067 0.0768 0.0751 0.0095 0.1036 0.0002 0.0002 0.0031 0.0005 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.0018 0.0012 0.0054
22 Utilities 0.0074 0.0043 0.0044 0.0014 0.0077 0.0026 0.0064 0.0045 0.0025 0.0098 0.0023 0.0074 0.0081 0.0037 0.0063
23 Construction 0.0058 0.0086 0.0159 0.0001 0.0029 0.0011 0.0023 0.0045 0.0021 0.0243 0.0006 0.0011 0.0028 0.0050 0.0210
31G Manufacturing 0.1973 0.0818 0.0611 0.2303 0.3412 0.0275 0.0307 0.1839 0.0736 0.0100 0.0453 0.0840 0.1296 0.0925 0.1156
42 Wholesale trade 0.0526 0.0127 0.0104 0.0374 0.0484 0.0251 0.0156 0.0323 0.0178 0.0029 0.0071 0.0178 0.0209 0.0141 0.0134
44RT Retail trade 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 0.0637 0.0023 0.0003 0.0037 0.0047 0.0003 0.0010 0.0007 0.0006 0.0062 0.0094 0.0001
48TW Transportation and warehousing 0.0286 0.0186 0.0372 0.0158 0.0244 0.0400 0.0473 0.1061 0.0141 0.0047 0.0135 0.0102 0.0126 0.0080 0.0183
51 Information 0.0017 0.0040 0.0046 0.0049 0.0072 0.0175 0.0191 0.0086 0.1615 0.0140 0.0285 0.0181 0.0139 0.0153 0.0289
FIRE Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 0.0443 0.0266 0.0211 0.0240 0.0130 0.0657 0.1024 0.0707 0.0474 0.1630 0.0736 0.1244 0.0818 0.1187 0.0284
PROF Professional and business services 0.0107 0.0474 0.0415 0.0300 0.0603 0.1204 0.1065 0.0575 0.0999 0.0710 0.1500 0.0958 0.1084 0.0570 0.0765
6 Educational services, health care, and social assistance 0.0008 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0055 0.0001 0.0006 0.0000 0.0002 0.0109 0.0014 0.0027 0.0086
7 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 0.0012 0.0017 0.0049 0.0017 0.0035 0.0055 0.0042 0.0033 0.0243 0.0080 0.0180 0.0131 0.0230 0.0052 0.0093
81 Other services, except government 0.0023 0.0011 0.0019 0.0039 0.0030 0.0122 0.0085 0.0048 0.0092 0.0054 0.0097 0.0131 0.0103 0.0091 0.0078
G Government 0.0063 0.0041 0.0063 0.0042 0.0091 0.0132 0.0118 0.0373 0.0153 0.0141 0.0083 0.0093 0.0133 0.0092 0.0131
Industries/Industries 11 21 22 23 31G 42 44RT 48TW 51 FIRE PROF 6 7 81 G
IOCode Name Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and huntingMining Utilities Construction ManufacturingWholesale tradeR tail tradeTransportation and warehousingInformation Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasingProf ssional and business servicesEducational services, health care, and social assistanceArts e t rtainment, recreation, accommodation, and food servicesOther services, except governmentGov rnm nt
11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 0.2177 0.0003 0.0000 0.0016 0.0474 0.0000 0.0013 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0003 0.0057 0.0001 0.0011
21 Mining 0.0067 0.0768 0.0751 0.0095 0.1036 0.0002 0.0002 0.0031 0.0005 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.0018 0.0012 0.0054
22 Utilities 0.0074 0.0043 0.0044 0.0014 0.0077 0.0026 0.0064 0.0045 0.0025 0.0098 0.0023 0.0074 0.0081 0.0037 0.0063
23 Construction 0.0058 0.0086 0.0159 0.0001 0.0029 0.0011 0.0023 0.0045 0.0021 0.0243 0.0006 0.0011 0.0028 0.0050 0.0210
31G Manufacturing 0.1973 0.0818 0.0611 0.2303 0.3412 0.0275 0.0307 0.1839 0.0736 0.0100 0.0453 0.0840 0.1296 0.0925 0.1156
42 Wholesale trade 0.0526 0.0127 0.0104 0.0374 0.0484 0.0251 0.0156 0.0323 0.0178 0.0029 0.0071 0.0178 0.0209 0.0141 0.0134
44RT Retail trade 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 0.0637 0.0023 0.0003 0.0037 0.0047 0.0003 0.0010 0.0007 0.0006 0.0062 0.0094 0.0001
48TW Transportation and warehousing 0.0286 0.0186 0.0372 0.0158 0.0244 0.0400 0.0473 0.1061 0.0141 0.0047 0.0135 0.0102 0.0126 0.0080 0.0183
51 Information 0.0017 0.0040 0.0046 0.0049 0.0072 0.0175 0.0191 0.0086 0.1615 0.0140 0.0285 0.0181 0.0139 0.0153 0.0289
FIRE Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 0.0443 0.0266 0.0211 0.0240 0.0130 0.0657 0.1024 0.0707 0.0474 0.1630 0.0736 0.1244 0.0818 0.1187 0.0284
PROF Professional and business services 0.0107 0.0474 0.0415 0.0300 0.0603 0.1204 0.1065 0.0575 0.0999 0.0710 0.1500 0.0958 0.1084 0.0570 0.0765
6 Educational services, health care, and social assistance 0.0008 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0055 0.0001 0.0006 0.0000 0.0002 0.0109 0.0014 0.0027 0.0086
7 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 0.0012 0.0017 0.0049 0.0017 0.0035 0.0055 0.0042 0.0033 0.0243 0.0080 0.0180 0.0131 0.0230 0.0052 0.0093
81 Other services, except government 0.0023 0.0011 0.0019 0.0039 0.0030 0.0122 0.0085 0.0048 0.0092 0.0054 0.0097 0.0131 0.0103 0.0091 0.0078
G Government 0.0063 0.0041 0.0063 0.0042 0.0091 0.0132 0.0118 0.0373 0.0153 0.0141 0.0083 0.0093 0.0133 0.0092 0.0131
 Industries’ inoperability ranking due to functionality reduction to utilities industry  
 
Industries’ inoperability ranking due to functionality reduction to transportation and 
warehousing industry  
 
Industries’ inoperability ranking due to functionality reduction to mining industry  
The inoperability rankings and graphs do not show the inoperability of the sectors subjected 
to reduction of functionality since they are an order of magnitude higher than the others, so as 
to allow a better visibility of the latter. The specific sector inoperability does not have an 
unique value but it changes in value and in position in the rankings according to the sector 
whose functionality is perturbed. Despite the model validity and due to its limitations, it is not 
able to “catch” some interdependencies. For example, surprisingly, the inoperability of the 
health care sector appears only at the bottom of all of the rankings, seeming as if the demand 
Code Industries q
R
 [%]
 21 Mining 0.50
 48TW Transportation and warehousing 0.14
 23 Construction 0.05
 PROF Professional and business services 0.05
 31G Manufacturing 0.04
 42 Wholesale trade 0.03
 FIRE Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 0.02
 7 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 0.02
 51 Information 0.01
 81 Other services, except government 0.01
 G Government 0.01
 44RT Retail trade 0.00
 11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 0.00
 6 Educational services, health care, and social assistance 0.00
Code Industries q
R
 [%]
 31G Manufacturing 0.36
 42 Wholesale trade 0.25
 PROF Professional and business services 0.19
 FIRE Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 0.16
 22 Utilities 0.14
 G Government 0.13
 81 Other services, except government 0.07
 21 Mining 0.07
 51 Information 0.07
 23 Construction 0.04
 44RT Retail trade 0.04
 7 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 0.03
 11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 0.01
 6 Educational services, health care, and social assistance 0.00
Code Industries q
R
 [%]
 48TW Transportation and warehousing 0.11
 31G Manufacturing 0.09
 PROF Professional and business services 0.09
 22 Utilities 0.07
 42 Wholesale trade 0.05
 23 Construction 0.04
 FIRE Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 0.03
 51 Information 0.02
 81 Other services, except government 0.01
 7 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 0.01
 G Government 0.01
 11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 0.00
 44RT Retail trade 0.00
 6 Educational services, health care, and social assistance 0.00
reduction on the three sectors does not influence the health care sector much. This can only 
mean that this sector does not strongly depend on the others and, as confirmed by the 
evidence, it has a high ability to isolate itself that appears especially during emergency 
situations. Also, the disruption to utilities generates an inoperability of the mining sector that 
is one order bigger than the others, while the other disruption causes inoperability comparable 
to each other. 
A correspondence among the industries of the economic data and the critical infrastructure 
sectors is needed and it has been assumed to apply the model to the network of sectors 
impacted by Sandy. Table 8 shows this correspondence, which assumes that the same 
interaction among the economic industry sectors can be identified in the network of critical 
infrastructure sectors. As seen, there is not a perfect correspondence among them and some of 
the industries in the economic data can be identified with more than one critical infrastructure 
sector defined in the report of the government of New York City. Some correspondences may 
also seem excessive, such as “Professional and business services”, which corresponds to solid 
waste, water, and wastewater management services, since this economic industry sector 
includes these services. Also, the original definition given by the DHS has been considered 
when no correspondence has been found, such as in the case of manufacturing, wholesale and 
retail trade, and government sectors that, among others, do not appear in the New York City 
Government (2013) report. For the purpose of this analysis, these correspondences are 
however assumed and provide satisfying results. 
[Table 8 near here] 
 
The values of inoperability provided by the method for the sectors interconnected with the 
perturbed one are extremely low when compared to the inoperability of the sector subjected to 
functionality reduction, which has a value practically equal to the percentage of perturbation. 
These values can be used to define sector rankings but, due to their dimensions, do not define 
realistic percentages of inoperability. A solution proposed to obtain more valuable values is to 
use these values as magnitudes so as to scale the inoperability of the other sectors 
proportionally to that of the perturbed sector. The new percentages of inoperability can be 
obtained as follow: 
Code Industries Critical infrastructure sectors
 11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting Food and Agricolture
 21 Mining Liquid Fuels
 22 Utilities Utilities
 23 Construction Buildings
 31G Manufacturing Critical Manufacturing
 42 Wholesale trade Commercial Facilities
 44RT Retail trade Commercial Facilities
 48TW Transportation and warehousing Transportation
 51 Information Communications
 FIRE Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing Financial Services
 PROF Professional and business services* Solid Waste, Water and Wastewater
 6 Educational services, health care, and social assistance Healthcare and Public Health
 7 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services Commercial Facilities
 81 Other services, except government Emergencies Services
 G Government Government Facilities
RjR R
j scaled pR
j
q
q q
q
        (14) 
The original value of inoperability qRj, calculated with the regional model and referred to the 
jth sectors not directly perturbed, is divided by the sum of these induced inoperability and this 
ratio is then multiplied for the value of inoperability of the sector affected by functionality 
reduction (qRp). These scaled values now define a meaningful inoperability that can be 
compared to that of the perturbed sector and are representative of reality. Reported in Table 9, 
Table 10, and Table 11 are the new inoperability caused by increasing percentages of 
perturbation to the three sectors under analysis, which now, after the supposed 
correspondence in Table 8, are “utilities,” “liquid fuel,” and “transportation”. 
[Table 9 near here] 
[Table 10 near here] 
[Table 11 near here] 
 
New percentages of inoperability due to functionality reduction to utilities sector  
 
New percentages of inoperability due to functionality reduction to transportation sector  
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10.00 5.87 1.65 0.60 0.54 0.47 0.32 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.00
20.00 11.74 3.29 1.19 1.09 0.93 0.64 0.39 0.30 0.23 0.17 0.01 0.01
30.00 17.61 4.94 1.79 1.63 1.40 0.97 0.58 0.45 0.35 0.26 0.02 0.01
40.00 23.48 6.59 2.38 2.18 1.86 1.29 0.77 0.60 0.46 0.34 0.02 0.02
50.00 29.35 8.23 2.98 2.72 2.33 1.61 0.96 0.76 0.58 0.43 0.03 0.02
60.00 35.22 9.88 3.57 3.27 2.80 1.93 1.16 0.91 0.69 0.51 0.03 0.03
70.00 41.09 11.53 4.17 3.81 3.26 2.26 1.35 1.06 0.81 0.60 0.04 0.03
80.00 46.96 13.17 4.76 4.36 3.73 2.58 1.54 1.21 0.92 0.69 0.04 0.04
90.00 52.83 14.82 5.36 4.90 4.20 2.90 1.73 1.36 1.04 0.77 0.05 0.04
100.00 58.70 16.46 5.95 5.45 4.66 3.22 1.93 1.51 1.15 0.86 0.06 0.05
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10.00 2.36 1.68 1.29 1.09 0.93 0.84 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.30 0.06 0.00
20.00 4.73 3.36 2.57 2.17 1.85 1.69 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.59 0.12 0.01
30.00 7.09 5.05 3.86 3.26 2.78 2.53 1.46 1.46 1.44 0.89 0.19 0.01
40.00 9.45 6.73 5.14 4.35 3.71 3.38 1.95 1.94 1.91 1.18 0.25 0.01
50.00 11.81 8.41 6.43 5.44 4.64 4.22 2.43 2.43 2.39 1.48 0.31 0.01
60.00 14.18 10.09 7.71 6.52 5.56 5.06 2.92 2.92 2.87 1.77 0.37 0.02
70.00 16.54 11.78 9.00 7.61 6.49 5.91 3.40 3.40 3.35 2.07 0.43 0.02
80.00 18.90 13.46 10.28 8.70 7.42 6.75 3.89 3.89 3.83 2.36 0.50 0.02
90.00 21.27 15.14 11.57 9.78 8.34 7.60 4.38 4.37 4.31 2.66 0.56 0.02
100.00 23.63 16.82 12.86 10.87 9.27 8.44 4.86 4.86 4.78 2.96 0.62 0.03
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 New percentages of inoperability due to functionality reduction to liquid fuel sector  
It is possible to notice and assume that there is a constant linear relation between the induced 
inoperability on one sector and the inoperability of the sector subjected to functionality 
reduction: an increase of the latter corresponds to a proportional increase of induced 
inoperability in the other sectors. This proportionality can therefore be taken into account 
through a new parameter, called inoperability ratio, that define the inoperability induced in a 
sector as a function of the inoperability of the perturbed one. Eq. X shows that it is calculated 
as the ratio between the inoperability induced in the network’s sectors and the inoperability of 
the sector affected by functionality reduction, also called direct inoperability. 
R
j scaled
pj R
p
q
Q
q
         (15) 
Since this ratio does not change with the increase of functionality reduction or perturbation, it 
can be considered as a valuable value for the evaluation of both the inoperability induced and 
the degree of interconnections. Table 12 reports the inoperability ratios of the three sectors 
this paper is focusing on. The sectors along the rows are the sectors subjected to a 
functionality reduction or perturbation due to the extreme events. The sectors along the 
columns are the impacted sectors whose inoperability is caused both by the perturbation to the 
row sectors and due to the interconnections. These values can be used as indicators to 
understand how the sectors affected each other and the amount of inoperability that is induced 
to the sectors of the network as a consequence of the degree of dependency and 
interconnection with the one perturbed. 
[Table 12 near here] 
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10.00 2.15 1.63 1.62 1.34 1.03 0.85 0.63 0.35 0.18 0.15 0.08 0.00
20.00 4.30 3.25 3.24 2.68 2.05 1.69 1.26 0.69 0.36 0.29 0.17 0.00
30.00 6.45 4.88 4.86 4.02 3.08 2.54 1.89 1.04 0.54 0.44 0.25 0.00
40.00 8.60 6.51 6.48 5.36 4.10 3.39 2.52 1.39 0.73 0.59 0.34 0.00
50.00 10.76 8.14 8.10 6.70 5.13 4.23 3.15 1.73 0.91 0.73 0.42 0.00
60.00 12.91 9.76 9.73 8.04 6.15 5.08 3.78 2.08 1.09 0.88 0.51 0.00
70.00 15.06 11.39 11.35 9.38 7.18 5.93 4.40 2.43 1.27 1.03 0.59 0.00
80.00 17.21 13.02 12.97 10.72 8.20 6.77 5.03 2.77 1.45 1.17 0.67 0.00
90.00 19.36 14.65 14.59 12.06 9.23 7.62 5.66 3.12 1.63 1.32 0.76 0.00
100.00 21.51 16.27 16.21 13.40 10.25 8.47 6.29 3.47 1.82 1.47 0.84 0.00
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 Inoperability ratios for functionality reductions of utilities, transportation, and liquid fuel 
sectors 
The effect of the functionality reduction occurred to a sector on itself is always equal to the 
maximum, defined by α%, β%, and γ% respectively for utilities, transportation, and liquid 
fuel sectors. The impact on the others has non-mutual variable values: the inoperability of one 
sector induced by functionality reduction occurring to another one is not the same of the 
inoperability of this last sector induced by the first one. For example, in the case of a 
functionality reduction to the utilities sector, the liquid fuel one is the most impacted with an 
inoperability always equal to 59% of that of the utilities sector, corresponding to an 
inoperability ratio of 0.59α%. Vice versa, the inoperability of the utilities sector induced by a 
functionality reduction to the liquid fuel sector is always the 13% (0.13γ%) of that of the 
liquid fuel sector. The same considerations can be made analyzing the impact of the utilities 
disruption on the transportation sector (0.16α%) and the vice versa (0.09β%), as well as the 
impact of the transportation disruption on liquid fuel sector (0.05β%), and the vice versa 
(0.22γ%). Overall, it is possible to explain these percentages and their lack of reciprocity by 
taking into account the dependencies among sectors during normal conditions and the way 
each sector affects the others when a disruption occurs. Both at the community and the 
company levels, several examples can be reported to support the previous percentages 
showing how each sector’s inoperability affected the others and how a single occurrence led 
to multiple consequences in the circumstances of Hurricane Sandy. For example, power 
outages caused disruptions and issues at every stage of the fuel supply chain. Refineries and 
pipelines in the area that were forced to close or reduce their operations because of no power 
to run their facilities, while terminals operations were suspended or limited also because they 
are not usually provided with on-site backup generators. Fuel could not be discharged from 
tankers and loaded into storage tanks and, as a consequence of the damage to the electrical 
systems, this also reduced the ability to dispense fuel to delivery trucks and caused the closure 
of several gas stations because of the depletion of previous fuel supplies. On the other hand, 
the impact on the utilities sector of the disruptions occurring to the liquid fuel sector was 
smaller. The fuel shortage limited the use of power and steam generation plants that, in case 
of natural gas disruption, preemptively have to switch to fuel as well as the possibility to run 
backup electric generators as alternative sources of power for more and less critical users. It 
also delayed utility restoration efforts by making more difficult to refuel the power restoration 
crews. Many other examples can be identified in order to support the other four inoperability 
ratio previously defined. 
α% 0.16α% 0.59α%
0.09β% β% 0.05β%
0.13γ% 0.22γ% γ%
Tr
an
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
Li
q
u
id
 F
u
el
UTILITIES
TRANSPORTATION
LIQUID FUEL
U
ti
lit
ie
s
The percentages in Table 12 have been used to select and rank the priority initiatives among 
the many implementable. In particular, a policy-maker should focus on those initiatives that 
can reduce the inoperability ratios between different sectors to values as close to zero as 
possible. There is the need to focus on this selection of initiatives mainly for two reasons: as 
reported by the damage analysis, the indirect damage were not negligible; the induced 
inoperability is a considerable component of the overall inoperability of one sector. A 
reduction of the inoperability ratios corresponds to an increase of the sector independency as 
well as to a reduction of its chance of being influenced by a problem affecting another sector. 
Several initiatives can reduce these values by reducing the influence that damage occurring to 
one sector has on the others, corresponding to a reduction of induced inoperability. Table 13 
to Table 18 give a better view of this selection of initiatives. They are organized 
distinguishing the cause of the induced inoperability, relative to something that happened to 
the perturbed sector, the effect of this cause, which is described as a problem or damage 
characterizing the impacted sector, and the specific initiative proposed to solve it. In some 
cases, more than one initiative can be considered to reduce the effect induced by a specific 
problem. In the cases in which a high percentage of inoperability ratio is obtained, it was 
possible to define more initiatives that help reduce it; whereas where these values are low, and 
therefore the induced inoperability also has a low value, a reduced number of initiatives were 
identified. Finally, some initiatives can be considered to reduce more than one induced 
inoperability, especially in the cases where multiple reasons led to a common problem, such 
as in the case of the overwhelming of transportation systems, which is a consequence of 
disruptions in both the utilities and liquid fuel sectors. 
On the basis of the numeric value of the inoperability ratios, the selected initiatives can also 
been distinguished between primary and secondary initiatives, as reported in the header of 
each table, so as to define a further prioritization among them. Primary initiatives are those 
that would reduce the higher inoperability ratio; secondary would instead limit the lower 
inoperability ratio. Primary initiatives also refer to inoperability ratios that can be easier 
reduced, since it can be assumed that it is easier to reduce an high value rather than a low 
value. 
[Table 13 near here] 
[Table 14 near here] 
[Table 15 near here] 
[Table 16 near here] 
[Table 17 near here] 
[Table 18 near here] 
 
 
 PRIMARY INITIATIVES FOR FUNCTIONALITY REDUCTION OF UTILITIES 
UTILITIES 
α% 
LIQUID FUEL 
0.59α% 
Causes Effects Initiatives 
Power outage 
No functioning backup 
generators 
Shutdown of refineries and 
pipelines or reduction of 
their operation 
1: Develop a fuel infrastructure 
hardening strategy 
Power outage 
Damage to terminals 
electric equipment 
Shutdown of terminals or 
reduction of their 
operation, impossibility to 
discharge fuel tankers 
6: Creation of a transportation fuel 
reserve 
Power outage 
No possibility to fast 
connect to backup 
generators   
Closure of gas stations 5: Ensure that a subset of gas stations 
and terminals have access to backup 
generators in case of widespread 
power outages 
Lack of planning of backup 
generator prepositioning 
Closure of gas stations 4: Provision of incentives for the 
hardening of gas stations 
Damage to electric systems 
and equipment 
Bottlenecks along pipelines 
and delays in fuel supply 
3: Build pipeline booster stations in 
New York City 
Damage to fuel facilities 
electric equipment 
Reduction of capacity to 
dispense fuel to delivery 
trucks 
8: Development of a package of City, 
State, and Federal regulatory actions 
to address liquid fuel shortages during 
emergencies 
SECONDARY INITIATIVES FOR FUNCTIONALITY REDUCTION OF UTILITIES  
UTILITIES  
α% 
TRANSPORTATION   
0.16α% 
Causes Effects Initiatives 
Power outage No functioning traffic 
signals 
3: Elevation of traffic signals and 
provision of backup electrical power 
Damage to overhead power 
lines torn down by tree 
branches and/or wind 
Closure of streets 6: Hardening of vulnerable overhead 
lines against winds 
Power outage 
Damage to tunnel electrical 
equipment and control 
systems 
Closure of road and rail 
tunnels 
4: Protection of NYCDOT tunnels from 
flooding 
Power outage 
Damage to bridges’ 
electrical equipment and 
control systems 
Inoperability of moveable 
bridges 
5: Installation of watertight barriers for 
mechanical equipment of bridges 
Repair or replacement of 
old and damaged subway 
electric equipment 
Delayed restoration of 
subway service 
1: Develop a cost-effective upgrade 
plan of utilities systems 
Power outage 
Inoperable key electric 
equipment 
Suspension of train and 
subway services, 
overwhelming of other 
transportation systems 
that do not rely on power 
9: Planning for temporary transit 
services in the event of subway system 
suspensions 
12: Planning and installation of new 
pedestrian and bicycle facilities 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
lines, and more private 
vehicles traffic 
14: Deployment of the Staten Island 
Ferry’s Austen Class vessels on the East 
River Ferry and during transportation 
disruptions 
16: Expansion of the city’s Select Bus 
Service network 
18: Expansion of ferry services in 
locations citywide 
11: Implementation of High-Occupancy 
Vehicle (HOV) requirements 
PRIMARY INITIATIVES FOR FUNCTIONALITY REDUCTION OF TRANSPORTATION  
TRANSPORTATION   
β% 
UTILITIES 
0.09β% 
Causes Effects Initiatives 
Street damage and closure Delayed utility restoration 
efforts and collection of 
damage information 
13: Implementation of smart grid 
technologies 
Street damage Limited access for repair 
crews to critical customers 
affected by utility damages 
14: Speed up service restoration for 
critical customers via system 
configuration 
23: Improvement of backup generation 
for critical customers 
SECONDARY INITIATIVES FOR FUNCTIONALITY REDUCTION OF TRANSPORTATION  
TRANSPORTATION   
β% 
LIQUID FUEL    
0.05β% 
Causes Effects Initiatives 
Street damage Limited access to fuel 
facilities 
8: Development of a package of City, 
State, and Federal regulatory actions 
to address liquid fuel shortages during 
emergencies 
Street damage Delays in fuel supply and 
fuel delivery trucks detours 
9: Hardening of municipal fueling 
stations and enhancing of mobile 
fueling capability 
  
PRIMARY INITIATIVES FOR FUNCTIONALITY REDUCTION OF LIQUID FUEL  
LIQUID FUEL   
γ% 
TRANSPORTATION    
0.22γ% 
Causes Effects Initiatives 
Closure of gas stations or 
limitation of their 
operations 
Additional traffic 
congestions in proximity of 
open fuel retailers 
7: Modification of price gouging laws 
and increase of flexibility of gas station 
supply contracts 
Fuel disruption Difficulties of refueling and 
limitation of emergency 
and critical storm response 
vehicle operations 
9: Hardening of municipal fueling 
stations and enhancing of mobile 
fueling capability 
Waivers for fuel 
transportation 
More dangerous fuel 
trucks on the streets 
15: Improvement of communications 
about the restoration of transportation 
services 
 
Gasoline rationing Reduced possibility to use 
private vehicles and 
overwhelming of other 
systems 
12: Planning and installation of new 
pedestrian and bicycle facilities 
14: Deployment of the Staten Island 
Ferry’s Austen Class vessels on the East 
River Ferry and during transportation 
disruptions 
16: Expansion of the city’s Select Bus 
Service network 
18: Expansion of ferry services in 
locations citywide 
SECONDARY INITIATIVES FOR FUNCTIONALITY REDUCTION OF LIQUID FUEL  
LIQUID FUEL   
γ% 
UTILITIES   
0.13γ% 
Causes Effects Initiatives 
Fuel shortage Limited use of in-place 
backup electric generators 
as alternative power 
sources 
15: Speed up service restoration via 
pre-connections for mobile substations 
Fuel shortage Inadequate fuel supply for 
power and steam 
generation plants that 
preemptively switched to 
fuel and consequent 
limited use of fuel for 
heating 
9: Strengthening of New York City’s 
power supply 
Fuel shortage Delays in refueling utility 
crews and delays in their 
restoration efforts  
22: Incorporation of resiliency into the 
design of City electric vehicle initiatives 
and pilot storage technologies 
Diversion of diesel fuel of 
the heating oil reserve for 
fueling vehicles 
Reduction of availability of 
fuel for building heating 
and use of other heating 
sources 
21: Scale up of distributed generation 
(DG) and micro-grids (photovoltaic) 
The results of the method can be therefore used not only to define the ranking of the most 
inoperable sectors but also to make a selection of the most priority initiatives to adopt in the 
aftermath of a disruptive event. 
The effectiveness of these initiatives in the recovery phase following the event has been 
studied through the application of the dynamic IIM. In particular, it has been used to evaluate 
the recovery of the utilities sector and the benefits brought by the initiatives proposed for it, 
due to the availability of data regarding the power outages that affected the area under 
analysis for the days and weeks following the impact of the storm. This data corresponds to 
the percentage of customers in New Jersey and New York City that lost power because of 
Hurricane Sandy’s impact on utility systems, which has been calculated with the following 
steps: 
 approximately 2.5 million customers were affected by power outages in New Jersey, 
corresponding to 62% of the total number of customers (source: U.S. Department of 
Energy), which is equal to about 4.03 million customers; 
 about 0.8 million customers lost power in New York City, out of a total 3.03 million 
customers (source: Con Edison, LIPA), thus representing 26% of the total; 
 around 3.3 million customers were without power in New Jersey and New York City 
in the wake of Sandy, out of a total of approximately 7.03 million customers, thus the 
percentage of power outages per customer in the area analyzed is equal to about 47%. 
The 47% of customers affected by power outages represents the inoperability of the utilities 
sector at time 0, equal to the initial point of its recovery phase that can be described with the 
exponential law expressed by Eq. 12. The sector recovery rate has been calculated with Eq. 13 
by considering the following further assumptions: 
 qi(Ti) = 1% 
 Ti = 30 days 
The recovery rate calculated with these values is ki=0.1289/day. The first expression 
represents the residual inoperability of the utilities sector at the end of recovery time Ti. Based 
on these values, the utilities sector achieves a 99% recovery in 30 days. Several authors, such 
as Lian and Haimes (2006), have considered this 1% residual inoperability in order to apply 
the dynamic model for the analysis of other catastrophic events, such as a terrorist attack to 
the infrastructure system. According to the information and tables provided by the New York 
City government report, it can be considered as a reasonable value for the analysis, as well as 
the recovery time of 30 days. 
The results of the application of the dynamic IIM are shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9. They both 
represent the behavior of the utilities sector before, during, and after the impact of Hurricane 
Sandy. This time-history is defined by the x-axis, in which time 0 corresponds to the impact 
and the perturbation induced by the storm. The y-axis instead represents either the 
inoperability or the functionality of the sector. The graphs are symmetrical since inoperability 
can be considered as the complement of functionality. 
[Fig. 8 near here] 
[Fig. 9 near here] 
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The law governing the dynamic model represents the response of the sector due to the 
implementation of the initiatives for utilities. Their effectiveness influences the recovery time, 
thus the entire recovery phase. In fact, if these initiatives had not been taken into account, a 
plausible assumption is that the recovery time would have been longer and more serious 
consequences would have been experienced by the sector and therefore by the community. On 
the other hand, recovery time would have been shorter if some of the initiatives proposed after 
Sandy’s impact had been already available for implementation in the event of its occurrence, 
improving the management of the emergency situation. This would have lead to a higher 
recovery rate and an increase in overall resilience. 
Overall, the results obtained are representative of the reality. In fact, according to what has 
been reported by the government of New York and by other sources, the efforts put in place 
for the recovery of the utilities sector drastically reduced its inoperability. The approximately 
10% sector inoperability at 15 days after the event can therefore be considered as a plausible 
value. 
 
Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to analyze the impact of Hurricane Sandy on the network of critical 
infrastructure sectors in the metropolitan area of New York. The Inoperability Input-Output 
model was used in order to gather and numerically define the interactions among these sectors 
on the basis of numerical data regarding their economic interdependency. The evaluation of 
the sectors’ inoperability has confirmed the damage analysis and the importance of utilities, 
liquid fuel, and transportation sectors in the network, as they were the most damaged sectors 
and those that caused the most relevant cascading effects due to other sectors’ dependency on 
them. 
In addition, the model was used to identify the priority actions to adopt during the various 
stages of emergency management. It means that it can be seen as a support tool that better 
guides policy-makers in the selection of the best actions that, among the many possible, 
should be considered for the determination of an optimal intervention strategy. In fact, just 
with the analysis of the initiatives and the evaluation of further criteria to organize them, it is 
not possible to understand which actions are the most important and why they should be 
implemented before others. Instead, unlike other authors’ applications, the output of the 
model in terms of inoperability was used to define a new parameter that supports this 
prioritization. Such parameter, called inoperability ratio, was defined in order to understand 
the percentage of inoperability that the perturbation in a sector causes on another. In this 
study, it was calculated for perturbations affecting utilities, liquid fuel, and transportation 
sectors. Several examples have been found relating to the influence that one sector had on the 
others during Sandy in terms of indirect damage, justifying the non-negligible inoperability 
ratio values referring to the interaction among these sectors. When the impacted sector was 
not also the perturbed sector, the highest (59%) and the lowest (5%) inoperability ratios have 
been both reported for the liquid fuel sector for perturbations that occurred respectively to the 
utilities and transportation sectors.  
In conclusion, the priority initiatives to adopt are those that reduce the inoperability ratio 
calculated between different sectors and thus limit the induced inoperability produced by 
damage not directly affecting that sector. The damage analysis showed that indirect damage 
accounts for a significant component of the overall amount of damage experienced by a 
sector, thus attention should firstly be focused on the initiatives that limit them. The other 
actions should also be considered, as they are equally important but would benefit only the 
sector for which they are proposed, reducing its inoperability and damage caused by the 
extreme event itself, and would not bring any direct improvement to the other sectors. The 
dynamic model realistically represents the effectiveness of these other policies during the 
recovery phase of the sector in the aftermath of the event. The analysis also assesses the need 
for an agreement among multiple decision-makers for a common planning of interventions 
due to the several interdependencies among the sectors that must be taken into account when 
working on improving the resiliency of the singular sectors. 
A possible development of this analysis could focus on the identification of other parameters 
for the evaluation of the contribution given by each initiative in the reduction of the 
percentage of  inoperability. Further modifications to the model should be introduced to 
account for this, since the original model only defines the interconnections among sectors and 
not the intraconnections, which are the dependencies among the infrastructures of the same 
sector. Also, additional data would be required, for example, to define the role/importance 
that each asset has in the overall sector. 
